Jan 18, 2010
US aid and extremism in Pakistan
When it comes to the relationship between the USA and Af-Pak (I’m co-opting Tariq Ali’s abbreviation for Afghanistan-Pakistan here), almost all the dialogue centres around military solutions and problems.
Granted, there have been some whispers about the role of domestic aid organizations, with legitimate funding requirements, who have voiced a dissatisfaction with the US military funding model and the collusion between domestic and military policies:
A number of aid organisations have told Al Jazeera they have turned down funding from the US government as the money has strings attached to military operations.
But the military seems to be the main source of this funding.
A few days ago, though, I saw this article in Al-Jazeera dated October 16, 2009, discussing a $7.5 billion aid package to Pakistan. Admittedly, the allotment of funds and the distribution have yet to be decided, but it is strictly a domestic aid package (to differentiate from a militarily sourced package as discussed above):
The US aid package to Pakistan is designed to fund projects in Pakistan that include schools and roads, agricultural development, energy generation, water resource management and the judicial system.
The part that stands out the most, or perhaps on par with judicial system I think, especially given the conflicts between the Musharraf regime and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, is education.
Why?
Well, I’m not sure if it’s due to an Adam Curtis bender I’ve been on lately, but I think this kind of news is meaningless without taking a really short trip back in time. Pervez Hoodbhoy – as far as English speaking/writing commentators on Pakistani domestic policy is concerned – presents a very well thought out and level headed perspective on the influence of the Pakistani education system, and seems pretty qualified to guide such a trip into its recent history:
During the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, madrassas provided the US-Saudi-Pakistani alliance the cannon fodder they needed to fight a holy war. The Americans and Saudis, helped by a more-than-willing General Zia, funded new madrassas across the length and breadth of Pakistan.
The “Saudi-ification” of Pakistan, as Hoodbhoy calls it, is directly correlated with the need, by the US, for mujahideen fighters to bolster the proxy against the Soviets. And the madrassas, in their current form, owe their success and influence entirely to the subsidies the US and Saudia Arabia provided, and continues to provide – a massive campaign that actively sheared Pakistan in a completely unexpected direction.
What I wonder now, however, is what shape will the new domestic influence in Pakistan have under the auspices of a new American administration? It seems that the domestic policy taken by American administrations has at its root the issue of defense and military need. And the situation, since the proxy wars of the ’80s, hasn’t really changed that much – war as an incubator of domestic policy remains the status quo. In 20-30 years’ time, unless something really different begins to inform American foreign policy as it pertains to domestic support, there doesn’t seem to be much to suggest that this same story won’t repeat itself.
